There is a paucity of academic literature on stable value funds, although they occupy such a prominent place among retirement investment vehicles. They are offered in roughly one half of all defined contribution plans in the USA, with close to a trillion dollars worth of assets under management. This paper is the first to rigorously examine their performance throughout the entire period since their inception in 1973. We produce the first comprehensive index of stable value returns. We conduct mean-variance analysis, Sharpe and Sortino ratio analysis, stochastic dominance analysis, and optimal multi-period portfolio composition analysis. Our evidence suggests that stable value funds dominate two (and nearly three) major asset classes based on a historical analysis, and that they occupy a prominent position in optimal portfolios across a broad range of risk aversion levels. We discuss the factors that contributed to stable value's remarkable performance and whether it can continue to maintain it into the future. In our paper, innovations are achieved in constructing efficient stochastic dominance algorithms, incorporating return expectations in multi-period portfolio construction, and in examining the multi-relations among competing stable value funds.
INTRODUCTION
There is a paucity of academic literature on stable value (SV) funds, although a growing volume of industry and practitioner research has provided an in-depth look at how the funds are managed and the stable values secured.
1 Our previous study on the performance of SV funds from the investor's point of view (Babbel and Herce, 2007) included only eighteen years of data, from 1989 through 2006, and did not use some of the enhanced estimation techniques (described later) adopted in this study. The lack of additional rigorous performance studies is rather surprising because SV funds occupy such a prominent place among retirement investment vehicles, with close to $1 trillion of assets under management.
2 They are offered as an investment option in almost half of all defined contribution (DC) plans, including 457, 403(b) and 401(k) plans, and by February 2009 reached 36.7 percent of their assets.
3 They are also available to participants in Section 529 Tuition Assistance Plans.
In this study, we provide a rigorous analysis of the performance of SV funds, enlisting an extended data set that goes from 1973 through January 1, 2009. We compare their performance to that of basic asset classes such as U.S. large and small stocks, long-term government and corporate bonds, intermediate-term government and corporate bonds, and money market funds using three methods: mean-variance analysis, stochastic domi-A stable value fund offers principal protection and liquidity to individual investors, and a quarterly guaranteed rate of return commensurate with yield levels on intermediate-term bonds. However, over ensuing three-month intervals, the guaranteed rate of return moves more slowly than intermediate yields. As a consequence of these features and the underlying intermediate-term bond investments, SV funds provide to investors returns with very low volatility. This combination of bond-yield-like returns and low volatility elicits contract or book value accounting of the investment, and is achieved by means of a cred-4 Traditional GICs are issued by an insurance company that guarantees the principal invested and pays a periodically-reset interest rate for a certain period of time. In contrast with a traditional GIC, whose sole guarantor is the issuing insurance company, a synthetic GIC contract's guaranties are "based on a separately managed underlying portfolio of fixed securities owned by the plan. Synthetic GICs are sometimes called 'wrappers' or 'wrap contracts' because they 'wrap' a specific portfolio with contractual benefits" (Tobe, 2004, p. 82). iting rate (see below) that allows the fund to smooth returns over time, in spite of fluctuations in value of the underlying bond portfolio. 5 Today, traditional GICs constitute about 5% of the overall SV fund assets in the aggregate, while the remainder is comprised of synthetics, which themselves are comprised of high quality, short maturity (usually well under five years) corporate and government bonds and mortgage-backed securities, and whose portfolio is protected against interest rate risk through a contract or "wrap" obtained from a high quality bank, insurer or other financial institution. This means that in all but a few prespecified circumstances, investors in an SV fund are able to transact (make deposits, withdrawals, transfers) at book or contract value, which is principal plus accrued interest.
Stable value funds do not require a set holding period and provide full access to the participant's principal and accumulated interest without a penalty. However, they are subject to the general restrictions within the overall plan. For example, many plans restrict participants from the direct transfer to a competing short-duration bond or money market fund by requiring that money transferred out of SV be first invested in a stock fund for a short period such as 30-90 days. This rule, together with the fact that plan participants make individual decisions regarding the allocation of their funds among various alternatives and do not act in concert, allows the wrapper guaranties to be purchased for a fraction of what it would cost if interest arbitrageurs dominated the pool and were revising their allocations aggressively.
CREDITING RATE FORMULA
From an investor's viewpoint, SV funds operate like a passbook savings account. They accrue interest at a prespecified crediting rate that is generally updated every three months to reflect changing market conditions. Their principal is secure and grows over time by the amounts of interest credited to their account. Crediting rates on SV funds change more slowly than bond yields and are computed according to a formula which basically produces an internal rate of return for the investment by requiring that the contract (or book) value of the portfolio converge to its market value by the end of the assumed duration. We define the variables in the formula as follows:
CR: crediting rate applied to the accounts of investors in the SV funds MV: market value of the underlying portfolio CV: contract value of the underlying portfolio D: duration of the underlying portfolio or duration of a benchmark portfolio Y: yield of the underlying portfolio, as described further below.
Given these variables, the future market value (FMV) of the portfolio is given by
and the crediting rate that guarantees this value, given the current contract value, is the solution to
Therefore, the crediting rate formula is given by equating the right-hand-side of expressions (1) and (2), and solving for CR,
Although other variations of the crediting rate formula are also used, expression (3) is the one most generally used. 6 In addition to small differences in the crediting rate formulae, managers do not always calculate the inputs to the formulae in the same way. For example, with respect to the measure of duration D, some fund managers use the duration of a benchmark portfolio, while others use the duration of the underlying securities. The yield measure Y is most often a duration market-weighted bond equivalent yield, although some variations have occurred.
Illustration 1 below details how the crediting rate is designed to make the contract value of the portfolio converge to its market value over the duration of the portfolio, assuming market conditions do not change in the interim. The case illustrated is where the contract value exceeds the market value, but the same procedure is used in the opposite case.
As indicated above, the crediting rate effectively smoothes returns by distributing gains and losses over a period of time related to the duration of the portfolio. The crediting rate formula above implies that the crediting rate is between the portfolio's return and its yield, Y, and closer to the portfolio's yield the longer the duration, D, is. The important thing to remember is that individual investors receive the same rate of return as the stated crediting rate, since principal is guaranteed.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
In this study we will measure the performance of SV funds vis-à-vis money market, intermediate government/credit bond, long-term government and corporate bond, small stocks, and large stocks investments using three methods of analysis: mean-variance analysis, stochastic dominance analysis, and enhanced multiperiod utility analysis. Each method has its advantages and drawbacks, but together we get a fairly clear picture of how well SV funds have performed. We conduct our analyses over the 20-year period beginning in 1989 that was dominated by synthetics and, as a robustness test, over the extended 36-year period starting in 1973 that included the period dominated by traditional GICs.
We begin with a mean-variance analysis, more because of its simplicity and ubiquitous use in practice than its theoretical properties.
7 Strictly speaking, the validity of this approach hinges upon whether investors consider variance to be an adequate measure of investment risk. In other words, investor preferences must be satisfactorily modeled using quadratic utility.
Beginning as early as 1967, Arditti determined that investors considered measures of downside risk beyond variance, and countless additional studies along similar lines have continued until now to demonstrate that variance is an inadequate measure of either security or portfolio risk.
8 However, if the distribution of market returns can be fully described by its first two moments, then restricting one's performance analysis to a meanvariance analysis can be justified, even if investors would otherwise be concerned about higher (and non-existent) moments of the return distribution. But all tests with which we are familiar demonstrate that return distributions for stocks, bonds, and money market instruments cannot adequately be characterized by their means and variances, nor does modified Brownian motion fully capture the movement in these asset returns.
Accordingly, we next measure investment performance using stochastic dominance analysis. Introduced in 1969 by Hanoch and Levy and by Hadar and Russell to remedy the shortcomings of mean-variance analysis, stochastic dominance approaches have the 7 An excellent treatise on this approach is provided by Markowitz (1987) . 8 Indeed, as reported by Douglas (1969) , John Lintner's initial cross sectional tests conducted in 1965 found that residual risk, which according to the Capital Asset Pricing Theory's version of mean-variance analysis is not supposed to be priced by the marketplace, was indeed important to investors. More rigorous studies since then have reconfirmed these early findings. Most recently, Cvitanic, Polimenis, and Zapatero (2007) have found that ignoring higher moments can lead to significant overinvestment in risky securities, especially when volatility is high.
clear advantage of taking into account all moments and other characteristics of the return distributions, and providing investment dominance analyses that do not depend upon knowing the exact shapes of investor preference functions. This has another distinct advantage over the mean-variance approach, which cannot be valid for various horizons simultaneously because it relies on normally distributed returns, which if valid (under certain conditions) for single-period returns is not valid for multiperiod returns. By contrast, the stochastic dominance approach remains valid because it is distribution-free. The limitations and additional virtues of this approach are discussed at length in the authoritative treatise by Levy (2006) . While some of the limitations have been overcome by a plethora of research, dating from the 1970s to the present, there remain two: 1) Stochastic dominance methods do not provide guidance into the construction of a portfolio from various individual securities. 2) Stochastic dominance methods do not provide an equilibrium price for securities.
Our third approach is an indirect approach to performance measurement, based on the discrete-time multiperiod investment theory of Mossin (1968) , Hakansson (1971 Hakansson ( , 1974 , Leland (1972) , Ross (1974) , and Huberman and Ross (1983) , remedies the failings of mean-variance analysis as well as the limitations of stochastic dominance analysis at the high cost of specifying the form of the intertemporal preference function. Grauer and Hakansson (1982 , 1985 , 1986 , 1987 , 1993 and others, applied this theory to the asset allocation problem with some success, where an empirical probability assessment approach was used to implement a set of investment strategies. We will not rehearse the details of the methodology here, as they are well documented in Grauer and Hakansson (1986) . The approach is indirect in the sense that we will determine whether, based on past asset return patterns and current expectations, SV assets would enter the optimal portfolio in any significant way.
Our calibration periods were comprised of 80 consecutive quarters, at year-ends 2006, 2007, and 2008 , which are twice as long as the 40-quarter periods relied upon by Grauer and Hakansson in most of their studies. 9 We undertook an enhancement to their approach by inserting for each quarter the then current expected returns for each asset class rather than using their historical mean returns and spreads. This is especially important for interest-bearing securities, because the lagging 80-quarter average returns may not reflect yield conditions and expected returns for the current quarters. Also, for stocks, rather than use historical average excess returns, we instead conducted a sensitivity analysis using various spreads above Treasury bills to test for the effect of different expected returns.
10 Then we adjusted the rolling time series of lagging quarters by using upper moment and co-moment preserving spreads, while substituting expected returns for only the first moment. Clearly this is more realistic and considers the available information on expected returns for each quarter across all asset classes, while taking full advan-tage of the relative stability of upper moments and co-moments of their distributions. We then derived optimal asset allocations for a wide range of risk aversion levels.
DATA
We begin the first phase of our analysis in January 1989, just a few months beyond the inception of SV funds, and continue through January 1, 2009. Later we extend the starting date back to 1973. These analyses are performed separately for reasons explained later. For non-SV investments, we use total monthly returns on the S&P 500 index, Ibbotson's small stock, long-term government bond and corporate bond returns, the Lehman Intermediate Government/Credit index, and the Merrill Lynch 3-month Treasury bill index. For SV funds, we use total net monthly returns and asset values (or quarterly where monthly data are not available) on various SV fund families sponsored by members of the Stable Value Investment Association (SVIA.) From these data we produce the first comprehensive index of stable value returns, including comingled funds, externally managed separate accounts, internally managed separate accounts, and life insurance general account stable value.
11 This index of returns is provided in Appendix B.
We note that except for small stocks and SV funds, returns are gross returns and need to be adjusted for management fees and transaction costs to be comparable to returns on small stocks and SV investments. We do this by subtracting average fees and expenses reported by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) for stock, bond and money market funds over the period of our analysis from the corresponding large stocks, bond or money market returns. 12 Figure 1 (next page) shows the evolution of mutual fund fees and expenses over the period of our analysis.
We have net return data on a subset of up to twelve major SV fund complexes, although some of the funds began operations after January of 1989. For a given year, we subtract one twelfth of the stock, bond or money market fees and expenses from the corresponding stock, bond or money market monthly returns in that year to calculate net monthly returns. (Moreover, we reduced the assumed 2009 annual average fees for stock and bond funds by 2 basis points or 1/6 b.p. per month in our performance measurements due to the late arrival of some data. In theory this would bias the study slightly against SV funds, but computationally it has no perceptible effect.) 13 Each fund complex may contain a dozen or more individual funds, whose returns are closely linked. Thus, the overall number of separate funds embraced by our index exceeds one hundred. Two of the twelve return series are quarterly net returns. Since the return on an SV fund is a quarterly crediting rate, set prior to the quarter to which it applies, for those two return series we use this quarterly rate to estimate a monthly return. For each month in a given quarter, the monthly return may be calculated as follows: R Monthly = (1 + R Quarterly ) (Days in Month ÷ Days in Quarter) − 1. This method results in a days-in-month pattern that very closely follows the pattern observed in the other SV monthly return series we obtained. of major SV fund complexes (among the 12 we obtained) for which return data exist over each month in the period of interest. The number of fund complexes reporting their return data over time mirrors the growth in the number of fund complexes in the entire market and is considered representative of the overall population of SV funds. We observe that, as the industry expands, more and more plan sponsors offer SV investment options.
Using these data as well as asset values for each fund complex, we construct a valueweighted average return series.
14 Figure 3 below plots this series together with the intermediate government bond net monthly return series for the period of our analysis.
The individual funds return series in the SV average are highly correlated among themselves. Both the average of pairwise correlation coefficients and an efficient measure of multiple correlation the multirelation coefficient indicate that the SV value-weighted average return series is highly representative of the individual fund returns. 15 In Table 1 (next page) we report these coefficients for a set of six SV fund complexes with data from January 1991 through 2008, and for a set of eleven fund complexes with data from April 1997 through 2008.
We observe that the return series for the fund complexes comprising the index are highly correlated, even when first differences are used to eliminate the downward trend in the data. Table 2 below presents summary statistics for the seven asset classes we study. It shows that over the period of January 1989 through December 2008, SV investments have had, on average, a higher net monthly return and a lower return volatility than either money market or intermediate government/credit funds. As expected, when compared to stocks or long-term bonds, SV funds have exhibited both lower average returns and volatility. These facts lie behind the results that we present in the next section.
RESULTS
6.1 Mean-variance analysis. As indicated earlier, mean-variance analysis provides a characterization of the trade-off between risk and return that is neither sup-ported by the statistical properties of the return data, nor by the theoretical logic of riskaversion. Despite these shortcomings, the mean-variance approach provides useful insights into the ability of SV investments to dominate other asset classes.
In this section we present evidence supporting the conclusion that, even as stand-alone investments, SV funds are superior in the mean-variance sense to money market and intermediate government bond funds. We also show based solely on historical returns that, when included in optimal mean-variance portfolios, SV funds contribute significantly to the portfolio, to the exclusion of money market, intermediate government bonds, longterm corporate bonds and even large stocks. In other words, optimal mean-variance portfolios contain only SV funds, long-term government bonds and small stocks in proportions that naturally vary with the expected return (or, alternatively, the expected volatility) of the optimal portfolio.
When discussing summary statistics for our net monthly return data in Table 2 (previous page), we observed that, over the period of our study from January 1989 through December 2008, SV returns exhibited both a higher mean and lower volatility than either money market or intermediate government bond returns. This feature can be seen in Figure 4 below, where we plot two efficient frontiers, one including all seven asset classes in our study, and one that excludes SV funds.
It is interesting to note the large scope for improvement that inclusion of SV investments brings to an optimal mean-variance portfolio for the lower three-fourths of the expected return range. As revealing as Figure 4 is, it does not show the full extent to which SV investments contribute to an optimal portfolio since it says nothing about the relative allocations of wealth among SV funds and other investments at different points along the efficient frontier. Table 3 below reports these optimal weights (again based solely on historical returns) for selected expected monthly returns ranging from 0.51%, the historical average net return for SV funds, to 0.94%, the historical small stocks net return.
We observe that no optimal mean-variance portfolio along the efficient frontier includes money market instruments, intermediate bonds or long-term corporate bonds. Not even large US stocks are included. We also observe that SV funds predominate in the lower portion of the expected return range, where one would conventionally anticipate seeing money market and intermediate government bond investments. 16 We do not want to ascribe too much importance to these findings, as they are derived in the context of return distributions that are decidedly not Normal, as evidenced by the bottom row of Table 2 , shown earlier. Consequently, theoretical support for the conclusiveness of our meanvariance analysis is compromised.
Continuing in the spirit of mean-variance analysis, we turn to the Sharpe ratio so commonly used in asset allocation and performance measurement. The Sharpe ratio measures excess return per unit of risk according to the formula on the next page:
where R is the asset return, R f is the return on the risk-free rate of return, and
is the expected value of the excess of the asset return over the risk-free rate. This ratio is used as a measure of how well an investor is compensated per unit of risk taken. Higher ratios denote greater return for the same level of risk. We present the ratios below on a monthly and annual basis for each asset class.
17
What is most noteworthy about these ratios is how much higher the ratios are for SV funds than for the other asset classes. Although our calculations are based primarily on monthly data, we also provide the usual annualized figures, but in two different ways. First, we show the annualized ratios where the monthly standard deviations are computed by multiplying them by the square root of 12. We also show the Sharpe ratios based on annual data. The degree of separation is higher for the monthly ratios than for the ratios based on annual data (owing to serial correlation in the way SV crediting rates are calculated), but the SV ratios are significantly higher in both cases. All other ratios are relatively close to each other.
We next use the Sortino ratio to focus more on the downside risk. 18 The Sortino ratio is based on the Sharpe ratio, but penalizes for only those returns that fall below the target return, which in our case will be the average riskless rate of return over the period of analysis. The ratio gives the actual rate of return in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of downside risk, and is as calculated below:
Additional insight into the risk/return trade-offs of SV funds compared to alternative asset classes can be gained by calculating the Sharpe and Sortino ratios, which we report in Table 4 (next page).
We note that the Sharpe ratio values for five of the asset classes are mostly clustered together, but the SV ratio is about five times greater than the highest of the remaining asset classes. This pattern is even more pronounced for the Sortino ratio. The extremely high Sortino ratio assigned to SV funds, relative to those assigned to other asset classes, results 17 The original "Reward-to-Variability" performance ratio, better known as simply the "Sharpe ratio" of William Sharpe was modified by him in 1994. The modified version of his ratio is used in this analysis. See Sharpe (1994) . 18 See Sortino and Price (1994) and Sortino and Van der Meer (1991) for a description of the Sortino Ratio. The theoretical foundations for the Sortino Ratio are provided in Pedersen and Satchell (2004) .
from the fact that throughout the entire 240-month period under consideration, the riskfree rate exceeded the SV credited rate only for thirteen months, and by small amounts. Hence, there were only a few, small observations that factored into the denominator.
What we can say from this ratio analysis is that the structure of SV returns is very different from that of other asset classes, and that its structure does not lend itself well to traditional mean-variance metrics for comparison. Although interesting, we ascribe little importance to any of these mean-variance findings, as they are derived in the context of return distributions that are decidedly not normal, as evidenced by the bottom row of Table  2 on page 11. Accordingly, this limitation compromises the theoretical support for the conclusiveness of our mean-variance analyses.
Stochastic dominance analysis.
We next discuss the ability of SV funds to dominate alternative asset classes in the sense of stochastic dominance (SD) which, as we indicated above, provides dominance criteria under very general conditions with respect to an investor's attitudes toward risk.
First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) imposes only one preference restriction -investors prefer more wealth to less wealth. In addition to this requirement, second-degree dominance (SSD) requires investors to be risk averse, i.e., to dislike a drop in wealth more than they like a wealth increase of the same magnitude. The development of thirddegree stochastic dominance (TSD) was motivated by a long observed preference among investors for positively skewed returns. A subset of the class of investors that prefer returns exhibiting third-degree stochastic dominance is the important group whose preferences are characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Such investors are willing to pay less for insuring against a given sized risk, on average, as they accumulate greater wealth, which appears to accord with observed behavior toward risk. Fourthdegree stochastic dominance (4SD) was developed to capture investors' aversion toward kurtosis, where returns are characterized by peaked distributions and fat tails, such that losses can be extreme. Of course kurtosis can favor investors who have asymmetric claims toward returns, such as investors in call options, but for investors who have equal claims to both tails of a distribution, the fatter tails cause a disproportionate loss in utility.
19 Table 5 presents the SD results among the seven asset classes in our study. Only the SV fund historical returns distribution dominates two asset classes in the stochastic dominance sense up to the fourth degree; none of the other asset classes dominate SV funds.
Turning to SV funds, they stochastically dominated money market investments by the first-degree and, as a corollary, by any higher degree as well. This is a direct consequence of the fact that when sorted returns for SV and money market funds are compared in a pairwise fashion over the past two decades, the SV return was always greater than the corresponding money market return. In other words, the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the money market returns was strictly above and to the left of the empirical CDF of the SV returns, meaning that for any given return the probability of obtaining a lower return with a money market fund is greater than with an SV fund. Consequently, any investor who preferred more wealth to less wealth should have avoided investing in money market funds when SV funds were available, irrespective of risk preferences.
Although SV funds failed to stochastically dominate intermediate government bonds by the first degree, they dominated by the second and higher degrees. This result is a direct consequence of the fact that while the empirical CDFs of these two asset classes cross (thus preventing first-degree stochastic dominance), positive intermediate bond returns during the period of our study were never large enough, relative to corresponding SV returns, to make at least some risk-averse investors prefer the riskier intermediate bond investment. Technically, the integral of the difference between the intermediate bond return distribution and the SV return distribution is positive for any return.
The results in this sub-section are remarkable. Not surprisingly, there is no stochastic dominance of any one traditional class over another, with the exception noted above of long-term government bonds over large stock due to the capital gains-inflated returns of the former occasioned by the extraordinary drop in yields over that period; indeed dominance is rarely encountered. Accordingly, it was surprising to find that SV investments dominated two of the major traditional investment classes. Grauer and Hakansson (1982 , 1985 , 1986 , 1987 , 1993 considers an investor who, at the beginning of each period, allocates wealth among various investment alternatives so as to maximize expected utility of wealth. The investment alternatives we consider are the same as in our previous analysis, but the investment horizon is assumed to be a quarter. Therefore, the return data we use are net quarterly returns for the period Q1-1989 through Q4-2008. At the beginning of the optimization quarter t, the investor chooses a portfolio that maximizes expected utility of wealth, w it is the fraction of wealth allocated to investment i in period t, r it is the investment i return that will obtain at the end of quarter t, and a ≤ 1 is a risk parameter. The function
Intertemporal optimization analysis. The intertemporal investment model of
is the familiar constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with risk aversion coefficient
In order to evaluate the expectation in (6) we need the theoretical distribution of quarterly returns which is not known. We therefore approximate this expectation using observed return data for the 80 quarters prior to a decision quarter t. 20 We also use yield data on money market funds known at the beginning of quarter t and historical equity and bond premiums, as explained below.
Note that SV funds offer a crediting rate that is generally reset at the beginning of each quarter. This means that for each decision period, the SV return is known at the time the investor solves the optimization problem. Therefore, the SV return is not random.
21
However, the remaining investments, large and small stock funds, long-term government and corporate bond funds, intermediate government/credit bond funds and money market funds have random decision period returns at the beginning of the period and thus the expected utility of wealth needs to be estimated. Grauer and Hakansson (1982 , 1985 , 1986 , 1987 , 1993 use the realized returns over the 40 quarters prior to each decision period in order to estimate the expected utility of wealth and solve the investor's optimization problem. We follow a slightly different approach, in order to avoid the difficulties involved in estimating expected returns using historical data (Merton, 1980) .
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For a given optimization quarter, the expected return on money market funds is taken to be the yield available on the day prior to the optimization quarter, expressed as a quarterly rate.
In the case of bond funds (composed of either long-term government bonds, or long-term corporate bonds, or intermediate-term government/credit bonds) we calculate for each quarterly return series the difference between actual returns and the sample mean. We then take this residual series and add to it an expected return that is constructed as the money market expected return described above (expressed as a quarterly rate) augmented by an appropriate historical bond premium calculated on the basis of quarterly return data from 1926 through the quarter. For example, in the case of long-term government bonds the historical quarterly average excess return over 3-month Treasury bills between 1926 and 2008 is 0.5679%, or 2.29% annualized. We therefore estimate the expected return on long-term government bonds, to be used in the optimization problem for the first quarter of 2009, as the sum of the money market yield at the beginning of 2009, expressed as a quarterly rate, and the 0.5679% historical quarterly bond premium. We incorporate this quarterly rate into the quarterly residual series for the sample of interest (in this case, the 20 We explain the use of an 80-quarter estimation window in footnotes 8 and 20. 21 We have ignored in our modeling here that a tiny part of the monthly return reflects return on cash and is therefore not entirely known at the beginning of the quarter. Moreover, large funds may have several overlapping cohort segments that constitute a given quarterly segment, and the cohorts may mature at different times during the quarter. As they roll off, they are substituted by a new cohort segment. In the past, this substitution has given rise to as much as an 8 basis points change in the overall returns of a given quarter. These changes are too small to affect the results of this section, so they are not considered here. 22 Properly speaking, solving the investor's maximization problem does not require direct estimation of expected returns. However, the sample mean of expected utility in expression (4), based on data observed over the 80 quarters prior to the decision period, will indirectly inherit the problems associated with estimation of expected returns, especially during a period where expected asset returns may have been timevarying. In our previous study, we experimented with estimation windows extending from 40 quarters to 111 quarters, and generally found that beyond 80 quarters, the estimation windows were quite stable. 80 quarters in the 1989-2008 period) to obtain a return series with the desired expected return. This procedure is also applied to our long-term corporate and intermediate-term bond series, and to our large and small stock series (with the exception mentioned below). The procedure we use to estimate expected returns gives us 80-quarter series of money market, bond, and stock returns that preserve the same second and higher moments and co-moments as the original quarterly return data.
Instead of calculating historical small and large stock equity premiums, we consider three alternative values for the large stock equity premium, 2.5%, 3.5%, and 4.5% per year over the money market expected return calculated as described above. These values reflect the recent and current discussion on the equity premium that is likely to obtain over the foreseeable future (Siegel, 2005; Welch, 2009) . Concerning the premium for small stock, we assume that it will be in the same proportion to the posited large stock equity premium (either 2.5%, 3.5%, or 4.5%) as the historical small stock premium has been to the historical large stock premium over the period 1926 through the end of each study period.
Optimal Asset Allocation for Q1-09.
We first find optimal weights for all seven investment alternatives, by solving the optimization problem in expression (4) for the first quarter of 2009, using the empirical distribution of returns for the 80 quarters in the period January 1989 through December 2008 as described above in order to calculate expected utility of wealth. Figures 5-A, 5 -B, and 5-C (below and next page) show, respectively, the optimal portfolio weights for selected values of the risk parameter a, and large stock equity premium of 2.5%, 3.5 and 4.5% per year.
Figures 5-A, 5-B, and 5-C reveal that only small stocks and SV funds are relevant in the optimal portfolios, irrespective of the level of risk aversion. As expected, SV funds rep-resent a larger fraction of the optimal portfolio as risk aversion increases. Also as expected, a larger equity premium increases the proportion of small stocks in the optimal portfolio.
The extreme results obtained in this case are due to the very low money market yields observed at year-end 2008, during the worst part of the recent financial crisis. Because of the unusual circumstances in financial markets this is a situation that, while optimal for an investor making decisions at the beginning of 2009, may not be representative.
In order to understand what expected return would be necessary for one of the excluded asset classes to enter into the optimal portfolio, we conduct an experiment where expected returns, as reported in Figure 5 -B (previous page), are increased, for each risk coefficient value, until a given asset class enters the optimal portfolio with either a 1% or a 10% weight. 23 Table 6 above displays the increase in expected returns (in basis points) for the different cases considered across the same range of risk coefficients applied by Grauer and Hakansson. 24 For instance, at a risk aversion index of -5, the expected returns on large stocks would need to be increased above the assumed expected return of by 142 basis points before they would enter the optimal portfolio with a 1% weight, and by 196 basis points before they would constitute as much as 10% of the portfolio, assuming that the expected return on all other asset classes remains unchanged. An examination of the calculations shows that, as expected, the increments to expected return in order for an asset class to enter the optimal portfolio grow as risk aversion increases. For example, in the case of large stock it would require an additional 696 basis points of expected return for 23 We do not consider money market funds in this experiment. 24 A more recent study confirms that the broad range of risk aversion levels used by Grauer and Hakansson has strong empirical support. See Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009). them to enter the portfolio with a 10% weight when the risk aversion coefficient is -15, compared to only 196 more basis points at a risk aversion coefficient of -5.
Of particular interest is how pronounced the incremental basis points need to be at high levels of risk aversion for large stocks compared to the bond funds. Also of interest is how much larger these increments need to be for the long-term bond funds versus the intermediate bond fund to reach a 10% portfolio weight, owing of course to the significantly greater volatility of the former. In contrast, the intermediate bond fund would require higher increments than the long-term bond funds to reach only a 1% portfolio weight. There are two reasons for this. First and most importantly, it is because data in Figure 5 -B show the expected return on intermediate bonds at 1.90%, much lower than the prevailing 3.58% rate on stable value. Recall that stable value yields move slowly in comparison with other bond yields, owing to the smoothing procedure described earlier.
The expected returns on long-term bonds at that same time were 50-64 b.p. higher than on intermediate bonds, so lower increments were required to reach the level of stable value. Second, the different risk characteristics of long-term and intermediate bonds factored into the necessary spreads displayed.
Optimal Asset Allocation for Q1-08.
Next we calculate optimal portfolios for the first quarter of 2008, using data for the prior 80 quarters. Figures  6-A, 6 -B, and 6-C (below and next page) show, respectively, the optimal portfolio weights for selected values of the risk parameter a, and large stock equity premium of 2.5%, 3.5% and 4.5% per year.
While small stock and SV funds are still prominent in this case, we now observe that SV funds enter the optimal portfolios at higher risk aversion levels than in the Q1-09 optimal portfolios and corporate bonds now enter the optimal portfolios in significant proportions for intermediate and high levels of risk aversion. In the case were we use a large stock premium of 3.5% (Figure 6-B) we also observe long-term government bonds representing around 3% of the optimal portfolio for a risk coefficient level of zero (logarithmic utility) and large stocks representing no more than 6% at higher risk aversion levels.
6.3.3 Optimal Asset Allocation for Q1-07. We finally calculate optimal portfolios for the first quarter of 2007, again using data for the prior 80 quarters. Figures 7-A, 7 -B, and 7-C (below and next page) show, respectively, the optimal portfolio weights for selected values of the risk parameter a, and large stock equity premium of 2.5%, 3.5% and 4.5% per year. This is a case where both money market and intermediate-term bond funds have expected returns above the SV return of 4.87%, which is contrary to the historical experience. For this reason, money market and intermediate-term bond funds play a significant role in the optimal portfolios for greater risk aversion levels below -5.
The yield curve at year-end 2006 was fairly flat with relatively high money market yields that exceeded SV rates. This has happened only rarely since 1989. Also, interest rates had been increasing steadily for about three years, a fact that disadvantages SV returns that tend to adjust to intermediate-term bond returns with a lag. This helps explain the limited presence of SV funds in the optimal portfolios for the first quarter of 2007.
It is also interesting to note that intermediate-term bonds have a significant presence in the optimal portfolios and that money market funds also enter. This is a consequence of the relatively high expected returns for these two asset classes, given their respective volatilities.
Robustness Analysis
While important, the implications of our three-fold analysis should not be regarded as dispositive. It should be recalled that over the 20-year period of the first phase of our analysis, which began with the inception of modern SV funds in 1989, interest rates exhibited a general decline to half their initial level, albeit with occasional and protracted periods of rising interest rates interspersed. Such a period of decline would tend to favor longer duration fixed income investments, including stable value, over money market funds. We sought to remedy this by examining the precursors of SV funds -traditional GICs -to see how they fared during the period of rapidly rising interest rates that characterized the late 1970s and early 1980s. Comparing Tables 2, and 7, we observe that average returns for a particular asset vary considerably, especially for small stocks, money market and SV returns. Small stocks have an average net monthly return of 1.21% for the extended period, compared with 0.94% for the period 1989 through 2008. This difference is essentially due to the better 25 Many SV funds use the Lehman Intermediate Government/Credit Bond yield series as a benchmark. We use the wrapped index based on this series as our proxy for SV returns prior to the beginning of our SV average return series in September of 1988. For the period of time during which the Lehman intermediate government/credit wrapped series and our SV return series overlap, September of 1988 through February of 2008, the correlation coefficient between the series is 98.5% and the average difference between them is only 4.955 basis points. In order to use a consistent proxy for net SV returns, we subtract this average difference from the Lehman intermediate government/credit wrapped monthly return for the period February 1973 to August 1988. performance of small stocks in the period 1973 -1988 and the smaller impact of the negative returns in 2008 on an average calculated over 431 months instead of 240. The larger money market average return of 0.47% for the extended period is due to the higher yields on debt instruments observed during the late seventies and early eighties. This is also the reason that the SV average return is significantly higher for the extended period (0.59%) compared to the average over the 1989 -2008 period (0.51%).
Evidence of non-normality is even stronger for the extended sample period, across all asset classes.
The differences we observe in mean returns for the two sample periods considered are reflected in the efficient frontier corresponding to the February 1973 to December 2008 data, shown in Figure 8 below.
We observe a much flatter efficient frontier for the extended sample period. This is the result of the higher small stocks average return and the lower long-term government bonds return, compared to the corresponding values for the 1989 -2008 sample period.
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The composition of the efficient portfolios reported earlier in Table 3 changes in some respects when the extended sample is considered, but it also remains the same in other respects. 26 An important factor in the degree of curvature of the efficient frontier is the correlation among asset classes. The correlation between small stock and long-term government returns is − 10.1% for the 1989 -2008 period and 6.1% for the 1973 -2008 period. Table 8 below reports these efficient portfolios for selected points along the efficient frontier. It shows that, as was the case for the 1989 -2008 sample, large stocks, longterm corporate bonds, intermediate-term bonds and money market assets are excluded from the efficient frontier. We also observe that the weights of SV funds remain approximately the same as they are for the portfolios shown in Table 3 .
The weight of long-term government bonds, however, is now much decreased across all efficient portfolios and the weight of small stocks is correspondingly increased.
Comparable Sharpe and Sortino ratios are calculated for the extended sample and reported in Table 9 on the next page.
We note that unlike the shorter period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , during which the money market rate exceeded the SV rate during only five percent of the 240 months, the extended periods, the extended period of 431 months contained 76 months (eighteen percent of the sample) during which money market yields exceeded the SV rates. It is therefore interesting to observe that extending the sample to include a period of significantly higher interest rates does not affect the relative performance of SV funds. 27 Again, the Sharpe and Sortino 27 The shorter period featured the higher money market rates at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. The extended period also featured many months during the late 1970s and early1980s when this happened.
ratios were spread across a relatively narrow range for the other asset classes, but the SV ratios soared far above the rest.
Turning to the issue of stochastic dominance, we find that SV no longer dominates money market investments by the first degree, as was the case for the 1989 to 2008 subperiod. This can be easily deduced from Table 7 (on page 26) since the maximum money market return exceeds the maximum SV return. This lack of first degree dominance is a consequence of the high interest rates observed in the late seventies and early eighties, compared to the smaller SV returns which behave like smoothed intermediate-term bond yields. However, over the extended period SV returns continue to exhibit second-, third-, and fourth-degree stochastic dominance over money market funds, as well as over intermediate-term government/credit bonds. As expected, the quirky result of long-term government bonds exhibiting second-degree and higher dominance over large stocks over the recent 20-year period does not hold for over the longer 36-year period of analysis, nor would it be expected to result in the future. The fixed income yields are sufficiently low today that the extraordinary capital gains occasioned by steep declines in yields, which inflated past bond returns, cannot recur any time soon.
It is also interesting to note that the distribution of SV returns almost dominates the distribution of long-term corporate bond returns by the second degree and is only prevented of doing so by the largest four monthly long-term corporate bond returns in a set of 431 monthly returns. Table 7 illustrates this result since we observe that the average returns of these two series are very similar while the standard deviation of SV returns (0.16%) is much smaller than that of long-term corporate bonds (2.82%).
The analysis in this section shows that the performance of SV investments is robust (one is tempted to say stable) to the sample period considered, in the sense that the extended period we use includes extreme interest rate movements as well as extreme stock return fluctuations.
The Value Proposition and Future Prospects
The positive evidence thus far, which covers the entire period of existence for traditional and synthetic forms of stable value, is intriguing and raises two questions: (1) What has been the value proposition that allowed these returns to be achieved? and (2) Should we expect this kind of performance over the future?
The value proposition 28 appears to have two facets, as explained by industry expert Chris Tobe. "On the asset side, some of the return above money market yields comes from investing at durations sufficient to capture the term premium that has been traditionally available in most markets. The funds also are able to take on a very small amount of credit and convexity risk and thereby gain some additional spread." They also sometimes invest in less liquid securities and occasionally GICs, which provide higher spreads than the most liquid assets. The first two of these factors help explain why SV returns have generally outpaced money market yields, but do not explain why they also have outpaced intermediate government/credit returns. For that we must turn to the liability side of fund management.
"On the liability side," continues Tobe, "the contribution to performance derives from behavioral finance factors. Stable value funds have contingent liquidity that the industry defines as 'benefit responsive.' From the point of view of participants, SV has the same liquidity as money market funds. Banks, insurers or other financial institutions take on the risk that everyone will not withdraw at the same time.
"Stable value providers mitigate their risk largely by being astute at predicting and underwriting participant behavior. Providers know that people tend to use less liquidity than they think they need. They know that the vast majority of participants, because of tax penalties, equity wash requirements that inhibit interest rate arbitrage, and simple investor inertia, tend to leave their money in stable value options for a fairly long time. Providers are willing, therefore, to guarantee a fixed rate for a traditional GIC or a minimum zero percent crediting rate each quarter for a synthetic GIC. Defined contribution participants want mostly principal stability and do not need daily liquidity for all balances." This allows the wrap providers to offer their guaranties at a lower price than otherwise would be the case. Any disintermediation that has occurred prior to the recent financial crisis has been occasioned by a run-up in equity prices, and not associated with a rising interest rate environment. This means that the wrap providers historically have not suffered massive withdrawals when costly interest rate arbitrage typically occurs. Because defined contribution participants tend to care more about principal stability than daily liquidity for all balances, this allows fund managers to take advantage of the steepness of the yield curve and seek credit and liquidity spreads. By contrast, money market funds must provide both principal stability and a lot more liquidity, which participants pay for in the form of a lower return.
Clearly, to be able to maintain the attractiveness of their funds, SV managers will need to continue facing yield curves that generally have positive steepness, and there is no guarantee that this will continue. High quality assets that offer attractive yields due to lower liquidity, negative convexity (which does little harm to stable yields), and adequate credit spreads will need to continue to be available at suitable prices. Furthermore, for SV funds to seek such yields will require that SV be offered only through vehicles such as defined contribution programs which cater to investors willing to be patient, while es-chewing the day traders and interest arbitragers. Stable value funds would probably not survive outside of that kind of protected environment. In the past stable value has incorporated relatively low management fees into its funds (averaging 60% of the fees charged by the average bond fund), which have included a low wrap cost of around 4-8 b.p. Recently that wrap fee reached levels as high as 12-20 b.p., creating upward pressure on total fees subtracted from the returns offered to investors. However, as additional wrap providers entered and reentered the market, these fees have fallen. In any case, aggregate fees have remained low and this has contributed to SV's continuing good performance.
Since their inception in 1973, SV funds have undergone several severe tests. They survived the market fallout from the OPEC cartels, the severe stock market declines of [2000] [2001] [2002] , the stock market crash of 1987, the interest rate spikes of the early 80's, the liquidity and credit spread crisis of the late 90s, the plummeting interest rates of the 21 st century, economic booms and deep recessions, the terrorist challenges to financial markets in 2001, and countless other challenging circumstances. With very few exceptions, 29 they appear to have weathered the recent financial crisis of 2007-8, even while the number of wrap providers dwindled briefly from 30 to less than a dozen, precipitating steep increases in wrap fees among those remaining.
Five factors have fostered the sort of disciplined investment behavior that has helped SV funds to ride out the recent crisis, as well as previous challenging market conditions over the past 36 years. 1) FASB's accounting standard, which grants contract value accounting protocol to SV funds rather than mark-to-market accounting, requires the overall portfolio to be of overall very high credit quality. If it is not, a fund cannot use contract value accounting.
2) SV fund investment guidelines set the overall direction of the portfolio and usually have stringent quality standards, limits in allocations to specific asset classes, and duration limits. Since SV is a conservative investment, the guidelines reflect this. The key principles of the Stable Value Investment Association reinforce the plan rules.
3) Wrap contracts, which are obtained only from financial institutions of the highest caliber, require that specific asset credit quality standard in order to obtain their wrap. They also have set a limit that is generally between two to five percent for a credit bucket in which any 'troubled' assets are put. The SV manager usually 29 The most notable exception of which we are aware was linked to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The liquidation of its Invesco SV fund was so precipitous that the usual safeguards that would have provided for an orderly shutdown and maintenance of principal were not undertaken, resulting in a small monthly decline in fund value of 1.7% in December, albeit an overall positive return over the year of 2%. In another instance, a fund manager (State Street) stepped up to the plate and infused an additional $610 million into its SV fund to offset some investment losses that it felt should not accrue to plan participants. One supplemental savings fund associated with Chrysler was not subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the protective umbrella from creditors that it affords. Therefore, Chrysler liquidated the fund and realized the loss for participants in advance of any potential claim by other creditors. There have been other funds that experienced severe stress, yet they weathered the worst part of the storm and have managed their market-to-book asset ratios back into the traditional ranges.
has a set time period to rehabilitate the assets in the credit bucket. If the SV manager violates the terms of the wrap contract, the wrap is void.
4) In the event that a wrap provider exits the business, other wrap providers typically divide up the vacant share. For example, a typical structure would have six wrap providers each underwrite 16.5% of the coverage. If one provider were to exit the business, the other five have contractually agreed to increase their coverage such that each provider would cover 20%.
5) The Stable Value Investment Association's membership reports no use of leverage through December 31, 2008. That survey was the 13 th annual survey, none of which have reported the use of any leverage. Even if the plan investment guidelines permitted leverage, it is doubtful that a wrap provider would ever allow it and to date none have undertaken it. In light of the recent financial crisis, which is precipitated and exacerbated, in part, by high leverage, SV funds are in a relatively advantageous position.
As long as these stringent standards are adhered to by fund managers, and individual plans are well designed, we do not anticipate a systemic failure to occur.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we use mean-variance, stochastic dominance and intertemporal optimization analyses to explore the performance of SV funds vis-à-vis U.S. large and small stocks, long-term government and corporate bonds, intermediate government bonds and money market funds, during the period February 1973 through December 2008. Despite the different focus of the three methodologies used, the results we obtain under each analysis reinforce each other in the sense that SV funds outperform the alternative investments we consider in one or more dimensions.
In the mean-variance sense, including SV funds in efficient portfolios considerably increases expected net return, and SV even predominates over long-term bonds, for levels of risk in the lower half of the observed monthly return volatility range, from 0.12% for SV funds to 5.69% for small stocks. In general, if the historical returns and volatility can serve as a proxy for future expectations, efficient portfolios would not include long-term corporate bonds, intermediate government bonds or money market investments, and would only include a small fraction of large stocks. Rather, efficient portfolios would be mostly comprised of long-term government bonds, small stocks, and SV in proportions that depend on risk tolerance.
Stochastic dominance (SD) analysis provides preference orderings among competing investment alternatives for all investors within a certain class of utility functions. The strength of SD analysis resides in the minimal requirements imposed on preferences but at the same time this may result in an inability to rank alternative investments that could be more easily ranked according to more restrictive approaches such as mean-variance. It is therefore quite remarkable to have found that SV investments stochastically dominate money market funds by the second-order and higher degrees. They also dominate intermediate government funds by the second-order and higher degrees, including dominance for the important class of investors characterized by DARA preferences. No other asset class was found to dominate SV funds, but we find that long-term government bonds dominate large stocks by the second-order and higher degrees over the recent sub-period. This is a very interesting result and largely due to poor stock performance during the crash of 2007 -2008 . As reported in Table 2 , the average net monthly return for longterm government bonds is higher than the corresponding average for large stocks (0.73%, compared to 0.65%), while the standard deviation is smaller (2.70%, compared to 4.18%).
Intertemporal optimization methods allow us to use the full joint empirical return distribution of alternative investments in order to determine optimal wealth allocations that depend on the risk aversion parameter of the investor. This analysis concludes that, for moderately risk-averse investors, SV funds are, under reasonable yield curve assumptions, a predominant component of an optimal portfolio, to the exclusion of money market funds and near exclusion of intermediate-term bonds.
Appendix A. An Alternative Stochastic Dominance Algorithm
In this appendix we present a recursive algorithm that can be easily applied to test stochastic dominance of an arbitrary degree (up to fourth degree in most practical applications).
The theory and practice of stochastic dominance (SD) is discussed in great detail in Levy (2006) . In Chapter 5, Levy describes algorithms used to test for first, second, and third degree stochastic dominance (FSD, SSD and TSD, respectively). The inputs for these algorithms are the sorted realized rates of return, for the period of interest, of the assets for which SD is to be tested. For a given asset, the sorted rates of return can be used to construct an empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF), assuming that each return has a probability 1 ÷ n of occurring, where n is the number of observations and where repeated returns have probability h ÷ n, and h is the number of repeated values. Levy (2006) presents separate algorithms for FSD, SSD and TSD. The algorithms for FSD and SSD are based on pairwise comparison of sorted returns and cumulative sorted returns, respectively, for the two asset classes being checked.
For FSD, this approach amounts to computing the difference of the empirical CDFs of the two asset classes for each point i÷n, with i = 1, 2, …, n. For SSD, the approach amounts to computing the integral of the CDFs difference, again for each point i ÷ n, with i = 1, 2, …, n. Note that the difference calculation for FSD and the integral of these differences for SSD are in effect calculated over the y-axis. Because of the linear functions involved, this approach yields the same test results as if the calculations had been done over the horizontal axis.
In the case of third or higher degree SD, however, this equivalence no longer holds, since the integrals now become non-linear functions of the values in the respective axis and, furthermore, using the same approach as in the FSD or SSD algorithms may lead to wrong conclusions. For this reason, Levy (2006, Section 5.4 ) presents algorithms for FSD, SSD and TSD based on integrals of the CDFs of the two asset classes. However, since the set of realized returns is different for each investment, these algorithms first have to be applied separately to the individual CDF of each investment and then combined in order to compare the resulting integrals at each point of interest.
We use an alternative approach that allows the derivation of a simple, unified and recursive algorithm, directly applied to the difference between the CDFs of the two asset classes being compared and having the same structure, independent of the degree of stochastic dominance for which one wants to test.
Our algorithm can be derived by (1) considering the union of realized returns for both asset classes over the period of interest as the set of all possible values under the distribution of a given asset class and (2) assigning zero probability to those return values that are not realizations of that asset class. For realized values, the empirical probability of a return value is taken to be the relative frequency with which that value is observed, i.e. h ÷ n for values that are repeated h times in a sample of n observations. We let m denote the number of unique realized returns across both asset classes.
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Table A-1 illustrates how hypothetical realized return data on two investments, F and G, observed over 20 periods are used to construct the set of unique realized returns and their empirical probability density functions, f(r) and g(r).
The first panel of Table A -1 shows the sorted hypothetical returns for the two investments. The second panel shows their empirical probability density functions (pdf). For instance, a −4% return has frequency 0.20 for the first asset and 0 for the second. 
for all r, with at least one strict inequality.
The arrangement of the observed returns for investments F and G illustrated in Table A This expression can be easily evaluated at the observed return values € r 1 , r 2 , , r m . In general, and corresponding exactly to the theoretical conditions in (A2a) and (A2b), it can be shown that Table A -2 shows that I 1 (r) (defined here as G − F) changes sign and so no distribution stochastically dominates the other in the first-degree sense. Similarly, I 2 (r) alternates sign, which means that neither F SSD G nor G SSD F.
By contrast, we see that I 3 (r) is positive for all relevant points and I 2 (10.0%) > 0. This allows us to conclude that F TSD G. Figure A-2 plots the function I 3 (r) for the relevant range of observed returns in the example of Table A-1.
As mentioned above, since the I 3 (r) function is non-linear between any two contiguous observed return points, one should also check interior points other than the observed returns in Table A-2. As Levy (2006) points out, this needs only be checked at interior points between two observed return points for which I 3 (r) turns from a decreasing function to an increasing function or, equivalently, when I 2 (r), which is the first derivative of I 3 (r), changes from negative to positive (between 4.6% and 5.5%, as shown in Table A For our example, this value is r min = 5.175% with I 3 (r min ) = 0.000061. The positive value of I 3 (r min ), together with the information from Table A-2, leads to the conclusion that F TSD G. From this result, it follows as a corollary that F also dominates G stochastically for any degree higher than third.
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31 Levy (2006) has a discussion on how existing TSD algorithms fail to check for interior points, but errors crept in apparently during the editorial process such that his example in Section 5.5, pp. 189 and 190, appears to be flawed. First, there seems to be missing data for an additional period in Levy's table on p. 189. This missing period needs to have observed returns of 10% for distribution F and 5% for distribution G in order to be able to exactly match the figures reported by Levy on p. 189. But even when this is taken care of, and Levy's calculations are reproduced, it is the case that the interior point he correctly identifies, at a return of 25%, gives a theoretical minimum value for I 3 (25%) of exactly zero. What Levy considers a negative minimum value of −3.3x10 -7 (incorrectly reported as positive 3.3x10 -7 in Levy, p. 189) is simply due to rounding error and so his conclusion that "… F does not dominate G by the TSD …" is not valid. Indeed, for Levy's example, straightforward application of the compact formulae and interior points check developed in this paper would conclude that F dominates G by the TSD.
